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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S. (61) 56TH MEETING HELD ON  
MONDAY, 28TH AUGUST, 1961

1. BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (61) 54th Meeting, Minute 3)

A. Draft Directive to General Norstad Prepared by the  
Ambassadorial Group in Washington

J.P. (61) Note 37

THE COMMITTEE had before them a Note by the Director of Plans examining two draft directives<sup>†</sup> to General Norstad, dealing with Berlin Contingency Planning, which had been prepared in Washington for consideration by the Ambassadorial Group on Monday, 28th August, 1961. A telegram<sup>\*</sup> from the Chairman, British Defence Staffs, Washington, was relevant to their discussion.

MR. KILLICK (Foreign Office) said that as a result of an initiative by Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara at a meeting of the Ambassadorial Group on Saturday, 26th August, 1961, the Military Group had drafted two directives to General Norstad, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces, Europe; the first amplified and modified the terms of reference for tripartite Berlin Contingency Planning agreed by the three Powers in April, 1959, and the second called for an extension of JACK PINE plans. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had been informed of the contents of the various telegrams from Washington on these matters over the weekend, and had discussed both the main points of principle and the one point of substance - nuclear planning - raised in them; they had agreed that at this stage there was no alternative but to accept the directives. The Foreign Office recognised that this decision perpetuated the unsatisfactory basis for planning which had always characterised LIVE OAK and, in particular, that once again a British Commander-in-Chief would be required to prepare plans which did not enjoy the support of H.M. Government.

\* COS. 1030/27/8/61

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In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) The United States military staffs and General Norstad, in his United States capacity, were already examining unilaterally the question of more extensive operations, including the use of nuclear weapons. There was therefore every advantage in the United Kingdom agreeing to take part in such planning or we should otherwise be unable to influence its course.
- (b) It was difficult to see how limited operations elsewhere in Germany would contribute to re-opening access to Berlin; indeed, the Russian reaction to such pressure might be to use it as an excuse to seize the whole of Berlin. Whilst these dangers were recognised, the United States attached importance to these wider operations as a means of proving to the Russians that they regarded Berlin as the focus of the East/West conflict and that they were determined to maintain their rights in the city.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Took note of the statement by the Representative of the Foreign Office and of the points made in discussion.

The Committee then considered the Note by the Directors of Plans paragraph by paragraph, and the following points were made:-

- (c) Paragraph 7. The comment on paragraph 4(a) of the first draft directive was agreed.
- (d) Paragraph 8. The substance of the comment on paragraph 4(c) was agreed, but it was thought that it would be sufficient if the words "and co-ordinated" were inserted after the word "consistent" in the second sentence of paragraph 4(c) of the first draft directive.
- (e) Paragraph 9. It was considered inappropriate to make the comment suggested by the Directors of Plans on paragraph 4(d) of the first draft directive.
- (f) Subject to the above comments, the Committee approved the Note by the Directors of Plans, but agreed that Sir George Mills should be instructed not to press for the inclusion of the amendments in (c) and (d) above against opposition.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (2) Approved the Note by the Directors of Plans, subject to their comments at (c), (d), (e) and (f) above.
- (3) Instructed the Secretary to inform<sup>B</sup> Air Chief Marshal Mills accordingly.

The Committee then discussed the second directive.

SIR EDMUND HUDLESTON said that the Air Ministry had already initiated a review of current plans under JACK PINE, to take account of possible counter-action against enemy airfields, anti-aircraft guns, missile sites and ground installations, which could directly interfere with an airlift: he proposed that it should now be expanded to include the threat of fighter attack, which might be mounted from airfields up to about 200 miles from the air corridor.

<sup>B</sup> Subsequently despatched as COS(W)23

## THE COMMITTEE:-

- (4) Took note of the statement by the Vice Chief of the Air Staff and agreed to consider the report by the Air Ministry at their meeting to be held at 1100 hours on Friday, 1st September, 1951.

MR. KILLICK (Foreign Office) said that the Foreign Office would now pursue with the Ambassadorial Group the question of informing NATO, in accordance with paragraph 7(c) of the first draft directive.

## THE COMMITTEE:-

- (5) Took note.

B. Single Allied Commander for BerlinSECRET

SIR WILLIAM PIKE asked whether there was any sign that the Americans would shortly request the implementation of the agreement whereby, in a time of crisis, the United States Commandant in Berlin would be appointed as the single Allied Commander.

MR. KILLICK (Foreign Office) said that there was no indication that the Americans were thinking of suggesting the implementation of this agreement. The arrangement was designed to meet a military emergency and from the United Kingdom point of view it was politically most undesirable to upset the present status of the three Allied Commanders in Berlin unless it was militarily essential to do so.

## THE COMMITTEE:-

- (6) Took note.

C. SHAPE Directive to CINCENT on Possible Military Counter-measuresTOP SECRET

THE COMMITTEE had before them a Secretary's minute covering a directive by General Norstad to CINCENT instructing him to plan for certain selected and limited offensive operations on East German territory; and a telegram<sup>9</sup> from the U.K.N.M.R. SHAPE giving the text of a directive in which General Norstad had instructed C-in-C, U.S.A.F.E., first, to bring up to date his plans for maintaining air access to Berlin, and secondly, to maintain specified numbers of fighter aircraft at an enhanced state of readiness.

In discussion the following point was made:-

- (g) This development emphasised the importance of bringing NATO fully into Berlin contingency planning on the political side as soon as possible.

## THE COMMITTEE:-

- (7) Took note.

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